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Summary. The efficacy of the urban regime and growth machine concepts beyond the US
remains a matter of considerable debate. Some argue that these frameworks retain considerable
value so long as they are ‘properly’ applied and that recent concerns about the limits to these
frameworks result from no more than their ‘misapplication’. I critically examine this argument
through a review of recent work on the mobilisation of business interests in British cities. The
central claim is that, even when focused on the ‘right’ issues and questions, US frameworks
quickly exhaust their explanatory capacity. In the context of a widening diversity of alternative
approaches, I suggest that it is time to move squarely beyond growth coalition and regime
accounts. The paper makes a number of suggestions for ways in which this new phase of theory
building might proceed.
1. Introduction
By the early 1990s, the growth coalition and
urban regime concepts were firmly estab-
lished as the dominant frameworks for study-
ing US urban politics. With the domestic
market for urban theory seemingly secure,
these frameworks were increasingly exported
to examine a variety of non-US contexts. Yet
despite its early promise, this process appears
to have rather quickly run its course in the
face of critical accounts that point to the
context-specific nature of the original formu-
lations (Ward, 1996; Peck and Tickell, 1995;
Jessop et al., 1999; Davies, 2003). The pri-
mary objective of this paper is to review
British applications of US theory in order to
determine its efficacy in the British context. I
conclude that the value of established US
theories is decidedly limited. A secondary
objective is to begin to consider ways in
which the study of urban politics and gover-
nance might develop in a post-urban regime/
growth machine context. Here I argue that
alternative accounts, focused on the restruc-
turing of the state, fail to address a number of
the central concerns of the growth machine
and regime literature—not least, the political
mobilisation of business interests. In con-
clusion, I make the case for greater use of the
strategic-relational approach of Jessop and
Hay as a means of seeking to address this
problem.
Clearly, not all commentators ascribe to
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the view that transnational applications of
US frameworks are of limited value. Harding
et al. (2000, p. 987) write, in this journal,
that cross-national empirical work deploying
these concepts has “enriched the literature on
urban politics”. Mossberger and Stoker
(2001, p. 830) claim likewise that the use of
the urban regime concept beyond North
America has “facilitated the development of
a valuable and plausible political economy
perspective”. Nevertheless, both of these ac-
counts readily acknowledge the limited na-
ture of the returns from cross-national
application. Yet rather than signalling an in-
herent problem with the reach of these
frameworks, the authors claim that the limi-
tations are traceable to “the partial and in-
complete way” in which US approaches
“have been adapted for empirical work”
(Harding et al., 2000, p. 987) or, in similar
vein, to problems of “misclassification” and
“concept stretching” (Mossberger and
Stoker, 2001). Both reviews conclude by
stressing the need for a more “careful”,
“rigorous” and “innovative” deployment of
US concepts.
Drawing these conclusions effectively
serves as a defence of the original regime
and growth coalition frameworks in a context
in which work on urban politics and gover-
nance is characterised by a growing diversity
of theoretical and methodological approaches
(for recent reviews, see MacLeod and Good-
win, 1999; and DiGaetano and Strom, 2003).
This is especially true of work on Britain
where, arguably, no single approach is now
dominant, as advocates of regulation theory
(Jones, 1997; MacLeod, 2001) jostle with
more constructivist or agency-centred ac-
counts focusing on the ‘practice’ and ‘per-
formance’ of government (Raco and Imrie,
2000; McNeill, 2002; MacKinnon, 2000).
Rational-choice accounts also continue to at-
tract some attention (Dowding et al., 1995,
2000).
The context of an expanding array of ap-
proaches to urban politics provides an oppor-
tunity to reflect on the merits and limits of
US frameworks and to assess the utility of
regime and coalition concepts for cross-na-
tional work. Whereas Harding et al. and
Mossberger and Stoker argue that the poten-
tial of these frameworks remains largely un-
tapped, this paper develops a contrary thesis
that foregrounds more fundamental limita-
tions. I review recent studies to suggest that
the explanatory capacities of US frame-
works, and thus their prospects, are decid-
edly limited (see also Dowding, 2001). In
short, the paper argues that the problem of
applying US frameworks is much more fun-
damental than one of poor ‘translation’.
The paper focuses on Britain and
specifically on the political mobilisation and
engagement of business interests in British
cities. There are three reasons for this. First,
while US frameworks have now been applied
to a wide range of different contexts, there is
a particularly sizeable and well-developed
literature on the British case. The volume of
such work allows for a reasonable assess-
ment of the limits of cross-national appli-
cation. Secondly, the question of business
engagement has been central to arguments
concerning the contextual reach of US the-
ory. For Mossberger and Stoker (2001) busi-
ness involvement in urban governance
represents one of the necessary or ‘core cri-
teria’ in determining the suitability of the
regime framework for cross-national appli-
cation.1 Thirdly, proponents argue that the
focus on business interests provides one of
the key advantages of regime and growth
coalition theories over alternative frame-
works. Harding et al. argue, for example, that
in a context of growing private sector in-
volvement in British urban governance, US
approaches provide
a compelling argument about the import-
ance of business fortunes to public
officials … [and] a number of pointers as
to which interests are involved in urban
coalition-formation, why and with what
effect (Harding et al., 2000, p. 991).
The remainder of the paper is presented in
five sections. The next briefly traces the de-
velopment of British applications and pro-
vides a summary review of arguments for
and against the use of US frameworks. Those
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eschewing the growth coalition and regime
frameworks tend to emphasise the ‘gap’ be-
tween US and British contexts. Those de-
fending the efficacy of the models argue for
a much more careful specification and appli-
cation. Section 3 critically examines an
alternative set of state-centred approaches to
explaining the changing nature of British
urban governance. Such approaches are de-
signed to transcend the limitations of US
theory but in doing so marginalise an import-
ant set of questions concerning the nature
and extent of business engagement in urban
politics. In section 4, I take this issue further
and review recent work that examines di-
rectly the nature and extent of business mo-
bilisation at the urban scale. I argue that,
despite the match between US urban theory
and questions of business mobilisation and
engagement, the propositions deriving from
the US literature largely fail to hold up to
empirical scrutiny. A fifth and final section
uses this finding to draw four conclusions
relating to the generalised use of US theories
and makes a number of suggestions for how
theorising and research might incorporate
some of the virtues of urban regime and
growth coalition models, while at the same
time moving squarely beyond them.
2. British Applications and the Value of
US Theory
The US-based literature on urban politics has
clearly proved to be a popular and productive
source for those seeking to examine the
changing forms of politics and governance in
Britain’s cities. Before considering these ap-
plications, it is worth sketching out the basic
tenets of the two major US approaches—the
growth machine and the urban regime (ex-
tended reviews are provided by Stoker, 1995;
Ward, 1996; and Harding, 1999). The growth
machine concept dates to Harvey Molotch’s
seminal (1976) argument that US cities
should be understood in terms of the efforts
of property-owning e´lites to realise their in-
terests in urban growth. Later extension of
the argument (Logan and Molotch, 1987)
sought further to specify growth interests and
examine the ways in which these interests
mobilised local governments in order to pur-
sue growth strategies. Logan and Molotch
argue that the effects of growth coalition
activities work to reproduce and further ex-
isting social divisions within the American
city.
The notion of the urban regime derives
from the work of Clarence Stone and
Stephen Elkin (Stone, 1989; Elkin, 1987).
Both Stone and Elkin retain an emphasis on
landed e´lites in understanding the politics of
US cities, but broaden their analytical scope
to examine the various governing arrange-
ments through which political and economic
interests seek to reproduce their power. In
this sense, regime theory represents a broader
framework that can be used to characterise
variation between cities in the nature of their
governing arrangements. Stone in particular
has argued that interests, and the relation-
ships between them, commonly crystallise
into relatively stable configurations based
upon a common understanding and agenda
that reflect the goals of those that make up
governing coalitions or regimes.
The earliest British applications of these
ideas drew on the notion of the growth co-
alition as a way of framing a set of concrete
changes that seemed to mark convergence
between the British and US cases (Cooke,
1988; Lloyd and Newlands, 1988; Bassett,
1990; Bassett and Harloe, 1990; Harding,
1991; Axford and Pinch, 1994; Lawless,
1994). A second, and closely connected, set
of studies shortly followed, drawing more
heavily on the urban regime literature and
Stone in particular (Harding, 1994; DiGae-
tano and Klemanski, 1993a, 1993b; Stewart,
1996; Boyle, 1993; Bassett, 1996). The ma-
jority of early accounts, whether adopting the
growth coalition or urban regime model, fo-
cused on an individual British city or locality
or, more occasionally, a handful of compara-
tive cases within Britain (for reviews, see
Ward, 1996; and Harding, 1999).2
In reviewing this literature, Harding
(1999) and colleagues (Harding et al., 2000)
identify three major and critical differences
between British- and US-based work. The
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first is the general emphasis on public-sector
agencies and local authorities in particular
and, in turn, the limited recourse to examin-
ing the role and influence of private-sector
interests on coalition building or local strat-
egy.3 Secondly, those accounts that address
the relationship between state and private
interests are seen to focus firmly on formal or
institutionalised forms of cross-sectoral col-
laboration, primarily in the guise of public–
private partnerships or quangos.4 A third key
difference between British and US work lies
in establishing what properly constitutes an
urban regime. Harding (1999) argues here
that work on Britain tends to employ an
overly elastic notion of a regime by dropping
the requirements of longevity and robustness
that are central to US work. This is a prob-
lem recognised by others (Dowding, 2001,
p. 8). Mossberger and Stoker express similar
concerns over the “misclassification” of ur-
ban regimes, arguing that
The problem is that all cities are assumed
to be regimes … [but] whether a regime
exists in a particular place is an empirical
question (original emphasis) (Mossberger
and Stoker, 2001, p. 815).
These differences in the focus of British- and
US-based research clearly complicate at-
tempts to assess the value of US theories and
concepts in examining urban politics and
governance in Britain. In asking whether or
not US approaches ‘work’ in the British case,
the existing literature provides two conven-
tional answers.
1. Yes, providing the frameworks are care-
fully attuned to the British context.
2. No, given that contextual differences sim-
ply overwhelm their explanatory capacity.
In the first camp, Stoker and Mossberger
(1994) argue that US-based theories work
once ‘cleansed’ of their ethnocentric assump-
tions. More recently, the same authors have
argued that recent cross-national research
demonstrates
the utility of using the regime concept to
explore the extent of business partici-
pation, the motivation for business partici-
pation, and other differences as well
(Mossberger and Stoker, 2001, pp. 824–
825).
Those that eschew US frameworks do so on
the basis that they remain heavily embedded
in the specific circumstances of the US case.
Peck and Tickell—for example, suggest that,
“the growth machine hypothesis … remains
a framework with which to understand the
particularity of US politics” (Peck and Tick-
ell, 1995, p. 59; emphasis added). Bassett,
although not explicitly rejecting regime the-
ory, argues that the regime concept assumes
horizontal linkages and coherence between
interests, whereas in the UK vertical linkages
within political hierarchies are much more
important in determining local politics (Bas-
sett, 1996, p. 550). In short, this set of argu-
ments suggests that stripping these ideas of
their ‘ethnocentric assumptions’ leaves little
residual explanatory capacity. Both Dowding
and Bassett revert to the alternative of politi-
cal networks as a means of describing and
analysing urban governance and its politics
(Dowding, 2001; Bassett, 1996). Peck, Tick-
ell and others following a similar line, plump
instead for a variant of regulation theory
attuned to the local specificities of political
and economic activity.
It is clear then that commentators have
drawn opposite conclusions concerning the
significance of context in limiting the reach
of urban regime and growth coalition theory.
Mossberger and Stoker see significant poten-
tial given a careful ‘tuning’ of US theory,
while Peck and Tickell see limited explana-
tory capacity beyond the country of origin.
These contrary positions are difficult to re-
solve and their oppositional nature helps to
account for the current impasse. Yet Hard-
ing’s critical review of existing work raises a
third, and intriguing, possibility in determin-
ing the value of US frameworks in the
British case. Harding suggests that the lim-
ited returns to recent work are the conse-
quence of the misapplication of US models;
that is, the theories are poorly applied, focus-
ing on the wrong sets of issues, phenomena
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and events. This argument holds out the pos-
sibility that the frameworks retain significant
but presently untapped explanatory potential.
In short a shift in research focus would gen-
erate significant returns to the application of
US models.
In advancing this case, Harding cites the
“abuse” of North American urban political
economy, arguing that
much of the British research on urban
regimes and growth machines adopts the
language associated with the two ap-
proaches but fails to test many of its
propositions in anything more than rudi-
mentary fashion (Harding, 1999, p. 685).
The silences in the case of work in the
growth coalition tradition include
little reference … to the function of ren-
tiers, the importance of ‘place-bounded-
ness’ for business mobilization … or the
role of local capital in influencing the pri-
orities of local authorities and the invest-
ment decisions of metropolitan capital
(Harding, 1999, p. 683).
Additional problems with regime accounts
include a neglect of both the informal pro-
cesses through which influence and resources
are exchanged as well as specification of the
mechanisms that secure the reproduction of
particular regimes. Harding also notes a gen-
eral failure to incorporate the normative con-
cerns of regime and growth coalition
literatures in addressing the regressive nature
of coalition-orchestrated urban development.
In the next section, I argue that more recent
work on Britain, drawing to a greater or
lesser degree on the regime and growth co-
alition traditions, has sought to address pre-
cisely some of these ‘missing links’ (Ward,
2000; Rogerson and Boyle, 1998, 2000; Bas-
sett, 1996, 1999; Bassett et al., 2002; Raco,
2003a, 2003b; Wood et al., 1998; Valler et
al., 2000; North et al., 2001). The conclu-
sions derived from this work regarding the
utility of regime and growth coalition con-
cepts are set out in the final section of the
paper. Critical assessment of US frameworks
has encouraged those studying British cities
to turn to alternative accounts. The most
influential in examining the increasing role
of local business e´lites within urban politics
is the state-centred approach advanced by
Peck and Tickell. The next section explores
this approach more fully. I argue that, despite
significant theoretical advances in examining
urban politics and governance in Britain, the
approach neglects an important set of ques-
tions concerning the mobilisation and en-
gagement of business interests. This is
precisely the space that US frameworks
promise to fill. I argue in section 4, however,
that recent empirical studies highlight the
limits of US frameworks and thus the need
for a renewed phase of theory building.
3. Centring the State
Whether arguing for or against US theory,
the principal cause of translation problems is
seen to lie in the variability of state struc-
tures. Differences include the size, scope and
political composition of the state, its auton-
omy from civil or private interests, and busi-
ness interests in particular, and the territorial
form of the British state. In crude terms, the
British state and its local components is big-
ger, broader, more powerful, left-leaning,
less porous to business interests and more
centralised than its US counterpart (Ward,
1996; Cooke, 1988; Valler, 1996; Harding,
1999; Davies, 2003). While the process of
governance rescaling continues to amplify
the salience of the sub-national level in
Britain, as well as elsewhere in Europe
(Boyle, 2000; Brenner, 1999), significant dif-
ferences in state form clearly help to account
for the direction in which British work has
taken US models.
Despite these differences, observers across
the theoretical spectrum are widely agreed
that, formally at least, businessmen and
women and their representative organisations
have a more prominent place in British urban
politics than at any time since the Victorian
era (Peck, 1995; Peck and Tickell, 1995).
However, we should recognise that this en-
hanced participation has been generated from
a relatively low base level through the 20th
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century. The combination of a more cen-
tralised state with a relatively weak tradition
of political mobilisation of business interests
at the local scale readily lends itself to a
particular explanation of the growing formal
engagement of business interests in urban
governance and policy-making. In short, this
development is seen to arise not from the
relatively autonomous mobilisation of busi-
ness interests, characteristic of the US case,
but rather as part of a national-state project
designed to restructure local government
along neo-liberal lines. Businessmen and
women serve as the advanced guard of a
national ideological and political project and
are “conscripted” and “drafted” in to “front”
organisations and funding bids (Peck and
Tickell, 1995, p. 55; Jones and Ward, 1998,
p. 31; Ward, 2000, p. 1098 respectively; see
also Davies, 2003).
In these accounts, business interests and
organisations are positioned as a tool through
which a particular political-economic
agenda—the neo-liberal reform of the state—
is implemented. Accordingly, many of those
working on urban politics in Britain have
looked to state theory as a means of provid-
ing the requisite leverage to explain a state-
driven and orchestrated process of political
mobilisation. Without wanting to deny the
critical significance of state restructuring, I
argue that such accounts fail to address three
questions that are important in establishing a
rounded account of urban and regional poli-
tics and governance and the important role of
business interests and organisations within
them. The first is why, in the absence of
compulsion, do businessmen and women an-
swer the “call to arms”? (Peck and Tickell,
1995, p. 55). Peck hints at an answer in
suggesting that the business people
“selected” in by the state tend to be of a
different type from those traditionally active
in representing business interests
It was the maverick entrepreneur, rather
than the bureaucratic manager, who came
to form the ‘new’ business e´lite under
Thatcherism (Peck, 1995, p. 24; see also
Rogerson and Boyle, 1998).
Participation is thereby rooted in a shared
ideological zeal on the part of individual
businessmen and women. There is little fur-
ther assessment of the mechanisms driving
engagement or the incentives that structure
its form. On this matter, the contrast with the
US literature is particularly stark; growth
coalition and regime formulations and the
critical extension of this work by others, such
as Cox and Mair, all focus centrally on the
various material interests that underpin busi-
ness politics (Cox and Mair, 1988, 1989).
British work in the state-centric tradition
lacks a similar specification of business inter-
ests. It is clearly difficult to test US theory in
the absence of this.
Secondly, the mechanisms through which
the central state choreographs an ‘appropri-
ate’ role for business interests in furthering
its neo-liberal project are not entirely clear.
While a political stage for business is created
via rules concerning the composition and
operation of new governing institutions, this
is sufficient neither to ensure business par-
ticipation (see above) nor to manipulate the
players such that they behave according to
script. In short, empowering newly mobilised
business e´lites is by no means sufficient to
guarantee that they will deploy their new-
found powers in the ways intended. Business
interests remain relatively autonomous from
the political interests that seek to orchestrate
their engagement. The granting of greater
discretionary power to the business-led
Training and Enterprise Councils (TECs) and
greater budgetary resources and flexibility to
the Regional Development Agencies (RDAs)
hints at some of the problems of seeking to
exercise control at a distance (Jones, 2001).
In both cases, central government has had to
satisfy demands for greater resources and
power made by these ‘business-led’ institu-
tions.
The slippage between the scripted role for
business interests and their actual perform-
ance appears to be considerable. Further-
more, a dynamic is now in play that has
seemingly encouraged further and continuing
demands on the part of business interests and
organisations for greater resources on the one
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hand and enhanced discretionary authority
over their use on the other.5 Bassett’s work
on Bristol indicates that, while state sponsor-
ship of an enhanced business role may have
been a critical initial stimulus to business
mobilisation, more recent developments from
within the business community have created
a “much more organised and also more
influential” set of interests (Bassett, 1999,
p. 188). Raco similarly argues that the devol-
ution of political power to Scotland has
enhanced the politicisation of some sec-
tions of the business community in a num-
ber of ways. Voluntary membership has
increased for all the organisations … This
has reflected both the growing demand
amongst the business community for
membership of representative organisa-
tions and an enhanced awareness amongst
such groups of the importance of develop-
ing a strong membership base in the con-
text of political arrangements (Raco,
2003a, p. 85).
These cases clearly point to the potential for
significant slippage between the political
rationale for and the routine practice of busi-
ness engagement in new forms of urban and
regional governance.
Thirdly, state-centred explanations com-
monly fail to specify the manner in which
and the extent to which business interests
modify governance structures and facilitate
the shift towards a neo-liberal agenda (Hard-
ing et al., 2000). The greater formal presence
of business interests in the political and pol-
icy-making arena should not be automati-
cally seen as an accurate measure of their
strength or capacity to effect change (Hard-
ing et al., 2000, p. 982; although see Peck
and Tickell, 1995, p. 58). Bassett et al.’s
(2002) more recent work on Bristol demon-
strates the inability of business interests and
organisations, in alliance with local political
e´lites, to force through urban development
projects. In the absence of detailed empirical
work on the impact of business engagement,
recent attempts to evaluate change have had
some difficulty in assessing how “local busi-
ness leaders enforce the new regulatory rules
‘on the ground’ ” (Peck and Tickell, 1995,
p. 62, see also Valler et al., 2000).
These three issues suggest that accounts of
business engagement centring on the restruc-
turing of the state are partial in what they
seek to explain and, in turn, how explana-
tions are constructed. While they may be
able to account for the formal involvement of
business interests on visible and high-profile
boards and organisations, such as the RDAs
in England, they are much less adept at
explaining the broader process of business
mobilisation at sub-national scales, a process
which can occur at some remove from the
state or even quasi-state ‘partnership’ bodies.
As previously argued
Explicit attempts to problematise the form
and character of private sector representa-
tion have been only limited and partial.
The nature of local business interests, their
translation into and through specific dis-
courses and institutional forms, and the
motivations underlying particular patterns
of business representation, remain largely
neglected (Wood et al., 1998, pp.11–12).
Rather than focusing singularly on formal
partnerships and committees and the ‘select-
ing in’ of certain interests in the manner
favoured by state-centric accounts, a number
of recent studies have begun to develop a
complementary consideration of the factors
that tend to drive business engagement. With
a focus on the composition of business inter-
ests, the tactics and strategies through which
business agendas are constructed and the ef-
fects of their deployment, this work largely
avoids the problem of ‘misapplication’. In
contrast to state-centred approaches, this
work provides a much more accurate gauge
with which to measure the merits and limits
of US frameworks in the British context.
4. Beyond the State
Rather than starting out with the restructur-
ing of state forms, and the role of business
interests within this process, a number of
recent studies have sought to examine much
more directly the differential mobilisation of
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business interests and the processes through
which business interests and agendas are
constructed and deployed (Rogerson and
Boyle, 1998, 2000; Raco, 2003a, 2003b;
Wood et al., 1998; North et al., 2001). In
order to assess the efficacy of US theories in
explaining these patterns of business mobilis-
ation and engagement, I set out the claims
arising from the US literature on, first, the
composition of local business interests and,
secondly, the expected relationship between
interests and political mobilisation. I then
briefly review a number of recent studies to
assess the extent to which results match these
claims. This is followed by a discussion of
work by the author (and colleagues) on local
business mobilisation in economically disad-
vantaged industrial towns in the North and
Midlands of England, which has been ex-
plicitly concerned with the mechanisms that
generate political activity on the part of busi-
ness interests (Wood et al., 1998; Valler et
al., 2000; North et al., 2001).
On the question of the composition of
growth coalitions and urban regimes US the-
ories provide a very clear guide as to ‘which
interests are involved in urban coalition for-
mation, why and with what effects’ (Harding
et al., 2000, p. 991). Central to growth coali-
tions are what Logan and Molotch variously
term “rentiers”, place entrepreneurs or
“parochial capital” (Molotch, 1976; Logan
and Molotch, 1987). Place entrepreneurs are
defined as “the people directly involved in
the exchange of places and collection of
rents” (Logan and Molotch, 1987, p. 29) and
principal among them are individuals directly
connected to real estate and real estate devel-
opment. Beyond the rentier core lie a host of
other growth machine participants including
local politicians, the local media and the
utilities, as well as a further set of “auxiliary
players” that have a somewhat more tangen-
tial relationship to growth (Logan and
Molotch, 1987, pp. 62–85). As noted above,
the mobilisation of local governmental power
and authority enables business interests to
realise economic gains through the in-
tensification of land use and the coincident
growth of economic activity.
Regime theory is rather more catholic in
its specification of the interests that underpin
governing regimes. While ‘landed interests’
are highlighted, regime theory’s concern
with variation between cities allows for a
broader typology of different governing
forms and agendas as well as the range of
business interests that underpin them. In
critically extending these arguments, Cox
and Mair similarly insist that the material
attachments that drive business involvement
extend beyond interests in land. They suggest
a range of additional forms of fixity that
generate a ‘local dependence’ on the fortunes
of a specific or particular geographical
locale (Cox and Mair, 1988, 1989). Accord-
ingly, we would anticipate that the business
interests active in British urban politics
would exhibit ‘local dependence’ of some
form.
On the question of the relationship be-
tween interests and mobilisation, US theory
indicates that locally dependent interests are
liable to take an active role in local politics
as a result of a significant material stake in
the local economy on the one hand, and the
prohibitive costs of exit from the locality on
the other. However, the relationship between
local dependence and political engagement
reflects a tendency rather than an empirical
regularity (Cox, 1998). Empirical work must,
therefore, recognise various possible combi-
nations of local dependence and political en-
gagement on the ground (Table 1).
Table 1. The dependence–engagement relationship
Low local dependenceHigh local dependence
1 2High local political engagement
43Low local political engagement
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The four possible combinations, whether
at the level of the individual business or the
local business community more broadly, in-
clude a direct and positive relationship be-
tween levels of dependence and the extent of
engagement (quadrants 1 and 4 in Table 1).6
Coalition and regime literatures indicate that,
on a comparative cross-national basis, busi-
ness politics in US cities tends to fall
squarely in the top-left quadrant. Indeed, crit-
ics argue that US-based accounts have devel-
oped to address precisely this set of
conditions in which a clearly specified set of
local material interests engage in collective
political activity in order to promote and
structure local economic development.
However, there are two interesting alterna-
tive scenarios that represent a disjuncture
between interests and engagement at the lo-
cal scale. In the case of quadrant 3, high
levels of local dependence may translate into
only limited or partial political expression of
those interests at the local scale. Pincetl out-
lines just such a case in Orange County,
California, involving a channel of influence
on the part of a major property developer that
extends directly to the federal level (Pincetl,
1999). Cox (1998) also provides a number of
examples of the ways in which agents and
organisations can ‘jump’ scales in giving
political expression to their locally dependent
interests. There is, therefore, no necessary
reason why the spatial scale of interests
should equate to that of their political ex-
pression. In the case of British cities, we
need to be open to the fact that local business
interests might be given political expression
at regional, national or even international
scales (such as via the European Union)
rather than, or more likely in addition to,
their articulation at the local level.
The fourth possibility (quadrant 2) repre-
sents one of an engaged business population
but on the basis of relatively low levels of
local dependence. This would record as a
US-type scenario in terms of the empirical
extent and configuration of business mobilis-
ation, albeit in the absence of the same gen-
erating mechanisms. In short, a similar set of
empirical outcomes are produced by an es-
sentially different set of causal mechanisms
or processes.7
The empirical findings from three recent
British studies that address, at least in part,
the dependence—engagement relationship
can be interpreted through the lens of Table
1. The studies are Bassett’s work on Bristol,
Ward’s study of Manchester and Rogerson
and Boyle’s study of business politics in
Glasgow. None of these studies records a US
quadrant-1-type condition, which must then
bring into question the utility of US frame-
works in accounting for the observed pat-
terns. In the case of Bristol, Bassett’s
examination of the new business e´lite found
that “although most of their firms stood to
gain indirectly from renewed local growth,
there was little evidence of direct benefit
from involvement in partnership activities”
(Bassett, 1999, p. 187). Motivations for par-
ticipation were rooted in a range of concerns
including a reaction to “local complacency
and lack of leadership” (p. 187) as well as
“the social responsibilities of business lead-
ers to put something back into their com-
munities” (Bassett, 1999, p. 187). In this
case, relatively high levels of engagement are
produced through mechanisms other than the
local dependence of interests (quadrant 2).
Ward’s (2000, 2004) work on Manchester
suggests a closer approximation to conven-
tional growth coalition and regime formula-
tions in demonstrating how a group of
“property-owning entrepreneurs” (2000,
p. 1103) sought to mobilise local political
actors and resources in seeking to
“safeguard” economic assets and “increase
the value of their land and property” (Ward,
2000, p. 1099). While Ward’s findings sug-
gest a quadrant-1-type scenario, this collec-
tion of economic interests lacked the
coherence and longevity deemed essential to
regime or growth coalition definition. Indeed,
having achieved its specific goal of re-
configuring the nature of Manchester’s mar-
keting initiatives, the group quickly
disbanded, retreating to a quadrant-3-type
condition.
Rogerson and Boyle’s (1998, 2000) study
of business politics in Glasgow references a
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similar mobilisation of property interests but
again finds that commitment to political ac-
tivity remains limited and restrained. They
argue that in the case of the Glasgow Opera-
tives Club, a partnership organisation dedi-
cated to attracting inward investment into
Glasgow, business involvement “is piece-
meal, project based and for the most part
reactive” (Rogerson and Boyle, 1998,
p. 116). Furthermore, their overall assess-
ment points to the absence of a “highly moti-
vated local business class, keen to articulate
a coherent political voice. Involvement has
perhaps not been lethargic, but neither has it
been enthusiastic” (p. 116). In one of the rare
attempts to specify concretely the local de-
pendence of business interests, Rogerson and
Boyle conclude that, “the Glasgow Opera-
tives Club consists of firms who are not, in
the main, locally dependent upon the Glas-
gow economy” (1998, p. 118). Their findings
reference a quadrant-4-type scenario but with
sporadic political activity that points in the
direction of quadrant 2. Recent research in
Bristol, Manchester and Glasgow has failed
to find a politically coherent coalition-like set
of business interests with strong material ties
to the urban economy. Yet in each case,
business mobilisation has tended to increase
over time through the formation of new part-
nership-type organisations, the increased ac-
tivities of traditional business organisations,
like chambers of commerce and the more
sporadic political activities described by
Ward in the case of Manchester.
Work by the author and colleagues on
three economically disadvantaged industrial
towns in the North and Midlands of England,
has also sought to describe and explain these
emerging patterns of business mobilisation.
The research focuses on three broad issues:
first, the relationship between interests, iden-
tities and the politicisation of business; sec-
ondly, on the construction of business
agendas; and, thirdly, on the relationship be-
tween business interests and economic devel-
opment strategies. The project involved
semi-structured interviews with 34 business
men and women, and a further 20 interviews
with representatives of business organisa-
tions, partnerships and local and central
government. The interviews explored a num-
ber of questions focusing on how business
men and women interpreted their involve-
ment in local political affairs, how business
identities and agendas were constructed and
mobilised and how effective these strategies
have been in producing change. The inter-
views also sought to specify the nature and
extent of commitments to the local economy
in the form of the fixity of assets, dependence
upon local supply and customer networks,
labour skills or immobility in the form of a
strongly localised brand or reputation. In
short, the research sought to specify the
level, nature and spatial extent of local de-
pendence and match this to the degree and
nature of political involvement.
US frameworks predict a clear relationship
between interests, identities and collective
political action on the part of business ac-
tors—a quadrant-1-type condition. Yet de-
tailed analysis of the interview transcripts
failed to find any simple logic of business
mobilisation rooted in local material inter-
ests, whether in terms of fixed assets or some
other dimension of local dependence. Indeed,
the ties between firm characteristics and the
extent and nature of their political activity
were complex and variable. For the most
part, the motivations driving engagement
were not readily reducible to any simple set
of commercial dependencies on the locality.
Here, the findings parallel the work on Bris-
tol, where business leaders “did not seem to
be narrowly motivated by economic gain”
(Bassett, 1996, p. 547), as well as the previ-
ously referenced work on Glasgow (Roger-
son and Boyle, 1998).
This is not to argue that there was no
evidence at all of material stakes driving
political activity. Indeed, an instrumental
economic rationale was evident in account-
ing for involvement in a number of cases.
Yet many business men and women inter-
preted their actions in terms of a strong
cultural attachment or affinity for the local
area. One particularly active retired business
executive emphasised his local roots, “If you
were to cut me in half, you’d find Barnsley
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written inside me”. A second local retailer
explained his family firm’s involvement in
local business politics in similar, albeit less
colourful, terms
We are concerned with the town. I mean
we’ve lived here, we’ve never lived any-
where else—Accrington is our life—we
would like it to be much better than it is so
we are concerned for it.
Other individuals tended to frame their in-
volvement in terms of a positive individual
or corporate commitment to social responsi-
bility
I’m somebody who enjoys life a great deal
and I think that if you’re fairly fortunate in
life you ought to be prepared to get off
your backside and put a bit back into
it—and that’s broadly me—it’s a very
simple philosophy but that’s broadly it,
you’ve got to get off your backside and
put something back in.
Another businessman expressed his reasons
for participation in local political activities as
“an obligation, a feeling of obligation to get
involved with the area in some way … we
are such a big employer in the area we
needed to put something back”. The careful
and detailed analysis of transcripts revealed a
diverse set of relationships between individ-
ual, corporate and professional logics of pol-
itical engagement that more often than not
belied a US model in which individual and
collective action is generated through an in-
strumental relationship to local economic
fortunes.
On the question of economic development
agendas and strategies, Logan and Molotch
posit a collective interest in ‘growth’ as the
ideological glue sustaining coalitional forms.
Regime accounts encompass a broader range
of objectives and strategies but still posit a
relatively straightforward relationship be-
tween interests and agendas. In the case of
the three English towns, the research failed
to find any such simple relationship between
business interests, identities and support for a
particular model of local economic develop-
ment. Indeed, analysis of transcript materials
indicates that support for economic develop-
ment among business interests in each of
three study localities was far from universal,
with a number of firms clearly locked into a
corporate strategy that rested firmly upon the
depressed nature of the local labour market.
For a significant number of employers, high
unemployment and the ready availability of
unskilled and semi-skilled labour proved a
blessing rather than a curse. A manager at a
large manufacturing firm noted that local
recessionary conditions “would probably
help us … because it would make labour
more readily available”. Other firms were
wary of a growth strategy tied to attracting
significant inward investment for fear of ris-
ing wage costs and the poaching of labour
(Wood et al., 1998). While business interests
claimed a significant role in generating local
wealth and providing employment opportuni-
ties, there was little agreement as to the
nature of the problems facing the locality, the
appropriate strategy for addressing economic
decline and thus no reasoned and consistent
business agenda to provide the basis for a
coherent and robust local coalition or urban
regime. While each of the three localities has
seen an increase in the level of business
mobilisation and engagement over the past
decade, it would be impossible to classify
this as the development of coalition or
regime-like forms. Instead, business interests
are differentially connected to the local econ-
omy, fractured around basic questions of
economic strategy and generally reactive to
political issues and policy.
5. Conclusions
This review of the literature and findings
from recent studies raises four issues con-
cerning the generalised use of US theories in
analysing urban politics and governance in
Britain. In this concluding section, I want to
discuss these issues and then address how
theory building might develop beyond the
limits of regime and growth coalition ac-
counts. First, and perhaps most obviously,
they suggest that the capacity of US frame-
works to explain patterns of business mobil-
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isation is limited. This observation applies
across the range, including the notion of
‘local dependence’ as well as the more
widely used growth coalition and urban
regime concepts. The specification of the
local dependence of economic actors fails to
generate the range of politically mobilised
business interests anticipated by US ac-
counts. Neither can the pattern of politically
active business interests be readily tracked
back, or reduced, to material stakes at the
local scale. Whether one moves from inter-
ests to political practice or from practice to
interests, the analysis of business mobilis-
ation in Britain points to a range of mecha-
nisms and motivations beyond those
identified by US frameworks; a ‘core inter-
est’ or dominant ‘logic of engagement’ along
US lines proves elusive.
Secondly, the findings render problematic
recent reviews of British applications of US
theory, notably those of Harding (1999) and
colleagues (Harding et al., 2000) and Moss-
berger and Stoker (2001). For even when
properly targeted on the ‘appropriate’ objects
of study, the findings fail to support the
principal claims derived from US work. In
avoiding the problem of misapplication, re-
cent work suggests that the shortcomings of
US frameworks are founded either in the gap
between the US and British contexts or, even
more troublingly for US theories, in struc-
tural problems inherent to those frameworks.
The third issue follows from the previous
observation. In the absence of a significant
body of systematic comparative cross-na-
tional research, it is difficult to assess prop-
erly the extent to which the limits identified
in the work on Britain resonate more widely.
At minimum, we should recognise that the
problems of translation provide an oppor-
tunity for a critical assessment of the domi-
nant frameworks for interpreting and
understanding US urban politics. If limita-
tions of contextual reach illuminate certain
shortcomings in US-based theories, then it
behoves us to ask whether and to what extent
these deficiencies might also apply at home?
One such question is to what extent business
engagement in the US case is also driven by
logics beyond those of an instrumental ma-
terial nature (Austin and McCaffrey, 2002).
Fourthly, the findings might well be inter-
preted as confirmation of state-centred read-
ings of mobilisation in the British case. The
paucity of direct material incentives suggests
that the key to mobilisation may well rest
instead in the missionary zeal that leads indi-
vidual business men and women to answer
the state’s call to restructure local institutions
of government. Yet, as indicated in section 3,
the scale, extent and complexity of mobilis-
ation indicate the partial nature of this view.
Furthermore, reasons for participation are
found to be complex, variable and irreducible
to a single logic. While for the most part
explanation of the patterns fails to reduce to
a local economic embeddedness on the part
of individual firms, neither is it singularly
located, as state-centred work suggests, in a
desire to enfeeble or eviscerate elected local
authorities.
In the late 1980s, academics studying
Britain’s cities began to embrace the US
concepts of the growth coalition and the
urban regime. Alternative frameworks at that
time were decidedly limited in addressing a
range of concrete changes that seemed to
mark convergence with the US context. A
decade or more later those interested in urban
politics and governance are confronted with
a veritable array of different frameworks.
These include, but are by no means limited
to, variants of regulation theory (Lauria,
1997; Peck and Tickell, 1992; Jessop et al.,
1999), actor and policy networks (Bassett,
1999; McGuirk, 2000; Lowndes et al., 1997),
discourse analysis (Imrie et al., 1996; and the
papers in Urban Studies, January 1999), Fou-
cauldian theories (Raco, 2003a; Raco and
Imrie, 2000; MacKinnon, 2000), rational
choice (Dowding, 2001; Dowding et al.,
2000) and accounts rooted in the social
movement literature (North et al., 2001).
This wealth of new approaches holds much
promise for future work on theorising urban
politics and governance.
Yet displacing regime and growth co-
alition models will be no simple matter.
Their attractiveness derives in large part
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from their grounding in a political-economy
tradition, while retaining an appreciation for
the dynamic complexity and variability of
urban politics. Current alternatives com-
monly fail to harness the structure–agency
dynamic in the same way, tending towards
one pole or another in seeking to understand
the nature of urban politics and governance.
Accounts rooted in actor and policy net-
works, as well as the social movements
literature, emphasise the dynamics of politi-
cal action. In examining the political mobilis-
ation of business interests, such accounts
have been helpful in determining the ways in
which business identities and agendas are
constructed and deployed. Yet such accounts
commonly tend to bracket out broader
changes in the economic and political condi-
tions within which individuals and institu-
tions collaborate and act. Structural change
in the nature of the state and state forms
provides the most obvious example. Ac-
counts rooted in regulation theory, or other
variants of neo-Marxist state theory, squarely
address this particular issue. But, as evi-
denced in section 3, such accounts tend to
explain changes in the nature of business
mobilisation and engagement through the
singular lens of state restructuring and the
role of business interests within that process.
An alternative that seeks explicitly to tran-
scend the structure–agency dualism is Hay
and Jessop’s strategic-relational approach
(Hay and Jessop, 1995; Jessop, 2001; and
Hay and Richards, 2000). Although there is
space here to provide no more than a skeletal
account, the strategic-relational approach
promises to transcend many of the limita-
tions of the urban regime and growth co-
alition models, while retaining an emphasis
on political dynamics within a changing
structural context. At its most basic level the
strategic-relational approach encourages a fo-
cus on strategic calculation and actions and
the ability of individual and collective actors
to learn and adapt. The emergence of a more
‘politically savvy’ set of local business inter-
ests in Britain is suggestive of such a process
and indicates that they operate in a relatively
autonomous fashion from any ascribed struc-
tural ‘logic’ (Valler and Wood, 2004). Yet at
the same time, the strategic-relational ap-
proach emphasises that the context for action
is ‘strategically selective’ in privileging cer-
tain interests and activities. The process of
state restructuring in Britain and its clear
tendency to ‘select in’ business interests and
organisations differentially, in preference to
other actors and social groups is suggestive
of this dynamic.
Clearly, much work remains in developing
the strategic-relational approach, not least in
demonstrating the efficacy of such a frame-
work for empirical research. Yet arguably the
approach provides a means of harnessing the
diversity of current approaches, retaining an
emphasis on the dynamics of strategic action
and, at the same time, recognising the strate-
gically selective nature of the context within
which that dynamic unfolds. The argument
set out in this paper suggests that it may well
be time to embrace and develop such an
alternative, acknowledge the considerable
debt to traditional US theories and move
squarely beyond them.
Notes
1. “There are … fundamental reasons for hav-
ing business participation at some level as a
necessary ingredient for urban regimes”
(Mossberger and Stoker, 2001, p. 825).
2. The one notable exception here was DiGae-
tano and Klemanski’s cross-national work on
Birmingham and Detroit (DiGaetano and
Klemanski, 1993a, 1993b, see also DiGae-
tano and Lawless, 1999, on Birmingham,
Sheffield and Detroit).
3. Examples cited here include the early work
of Bassett (1990) and Bassett and Harloe
(1990) on Swindon, and the more recent
work of Dowding and colleagues (1999) on
London.
4. Cited work here includes Ward (1996),
Lloyd and Newlands (1988) study of Ab-
erdeen and Axford and Pinch’s (1994) analy-
sis of the Hampshire Development
Authority. Davies (2003) has a similar em-
phasis.
5. The recent Confederation of British Industry
review RDAs: Getting Down to Business es-
tablished a 10-point action plan that included
a demand for greater “budgetary flexibility
and operational freedom” coupled with
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“stronger engagement with business” and the
need for an even more substantial business
presence on RDA Boards (CBI, 2001).
6. Individual firms can be positioned within the
table, as can local business communities as a
whole. However, the latter exercise must be
undertaken with caution given significant
variations between firms in the nature, level
and spatial extent of their local dependence.
7. A number of British studies in the regime
mould devote considerable energy to the
construction of regime typologies based on
concrete characteristics of governing coali-
tions. Yet as Ward suggests
It is the mechanisms underpinning the
forming of regimes rather than super-
ficially similar concrete outcomes which
will provide urban regime analysis with
theoretical power (Ward, 1996, p. 429).
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